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Kaiser: Criminal Procedure--Habeas Corpus--Federal Jurisdiction Expanded

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-HABEAS
CORPUS-FEDERAL JURISDICTION
EXPANDED
The petitioner, Charles Braden, was indicted by a Kentucky
grand jury for the commission of felonies, but prior to trial he
escaped from custody. He was later arrested and convicted of felonies committed in Alabama and imprisoned in the Alabama
state prison. When the Kentucky authorities lodged an interstate
detainer' with the Alabama warden, Braden unsuccessfully re2
quested a speedy trial as guaranteed by the sixth amendment.
The petitioner then instituted habeas corpus proceedings in the
Federal District Court for the Western District of Kentucky naming the Kentucky authorities who had lodged the detainer as respondents.3 The district court ruled that the petitioner had been
denied a speedy trial and ordered the Kentucky authorities to
secure his presence in Kentucky for trial within sixty days or dismiss the indictment against him. The Commonwealth of Kentucky
appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed,
applying the reasoning of Ahrens v. Clark4 which required the
physical presence of the petitioner within the territorial jurisdic'An interstate detainer is a warrant or "hold order" filed against a prisoner
imprisoned in another state or jurisdiction. Its purpose is to insure that after the
prisoner has completed his present term of detention, he will be made available to
the authority which has placed the detainer. This system developed in response to
the problems of sovereignty and expediency which arise when two states want the
same man for trial. However, the system is easily used to the detriment of the
prisoner. A detainer may be filed by a great number of officials and for as little
reason as a desire to question the prisoner. Additionally, the detainer has made it
easy to categorize prisoners. When a detainer has been filed against him, a prisoner
is deemed a bad security risk, thus being denied many otherwise available privileges, including, in some jurisdictions, the opportunity for parole. Jacob and
Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoners'Need for Legal Services in the CriminalCorrectionalProcess, 18 U. KAN. L. REv. 493, 579-89 (1970); Tuttle, Catch 2254:
FederalJurisdictionand Interstate Detainers,32 U. Prrr. L. REv. 489 (1971); Note,
Detainers and the CorrectionalProcess, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 417.
'The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[iln
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public

trial ...." In Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969), the Supreme Court held that
when a prisoner in one state who has been indicted on a criminal charge in a second
state demands to be brought to trial on the indictment, the second state must make
a "diligent, good-faith effort" to bring him to trial.
3
The federal habeas corpus statute is found at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970) (hereinafter referred to as section 2241).
4335 U.S. 188 (1948). The circuit court based its decision upon its previous
decision in White v. Tennessee, 447 F.2d 1354 (6th Cir. 1971). White was based
upon Ahrens.
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tion of the district court as a prerequisite to the granting of a
petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus.'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held,
reversed. The Court overruled Ahrens v. Clark, holding that federal habeas corpus jurisdiction is not limited to petitions filed by
persons physically within the territorial limits of the district court,
so long as the court issuing the writ has jurisdiction over the custodian of the prisoner. Braden v. Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S.
484 (1973).
The writ of habeas corpus originated in English common law
and was thought so important by the founding fathers of this country that a clause was inserted into the United States Constitution
providing that the privilege of the writ may not be suspended
except in cases of rebellion, invasion, or the necessity of public
safety.' Congress revised this area of the law in 1867, making two
important changes in the granting of the writ. First, the availability of federal habeas corpus was extended to state as well as federal
prisoners when the state prisoner was held in "violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."'7 Second, the
power to grant writs of habeas corpus was given to "the Supreme
Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge
within their respectivejurisdictions.""
The significance of the phrase "within their respective jurisdictions" remained uncertain until 1948 when the Supreme Court
decided Ahrens v. Clark? In Ahrens, a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus was filed by 120 German nationals held in custody at Ellis
Island, New York, prior to deportation. The petition was filed in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, naming the Attorney General of the United States as respondent. The
5

Braden v. Judicial Circuit Court, 454 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1972).

'U.S. Const. art. I, § 9.
128 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970). The statute as quoted is as the law presently

appears. As enacted into law in 1867, the statute read: "That the several courts of
the United States, and the several justices and judges of such courts, within their
respective jurisdictions, in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall

have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or

law of the United States .

. . ."

Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.

Compare with the original habeas corpus law. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14,

1 Stat. 73.
128 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1970) (emphasis added). For the text of the original
statute, see note 7 supra.
'335 U.S. 188 (1948).
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Supreme Court held that the petitioner's physical presence within
the territorial jurisdiction of the district court was a prerequisite
to granting a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court based
its decision primarily upon the belief that Congress's paramount
concerns were the risk of escape and the administrative expense
connected with transporting a prisoner to whatever district court
he might desire to petition."
In light of its decisions in McNally v. Hill"' and Hirota v.
MacArthur,'2 it appears that the Supreme Court did not intend its
holding in Ahrens to seriously limit the availability of the writ to
state prisoners. In McNally v. Hill, the Court held that a prisoner
serving the first of two consecutive sentences could not attack the
second of these through habeas corpus. The Court reasoned that
"[a] sentence that the prisoner has not begun to serve cannot be
the cause of restraint which the statute makes the subject of inquiry.' 3 McNally established the prematurity doctrine," which,
broadly stated, means that a prisoner cannot contest through habeas corpus any prison sentence which will not be served until
sometime in the future. Thus, if the prisoner can only contest the
sentence he is presently serving, no hardship is imposed by requiring him to file his petition in the district court of his confinement,
naming his present jailer as respondent.
In Hirota v. MacArthur, the Court held that a military tribunal established in Japan by the Allied Powers was not a tribunal
of the United States and,, therefore, "the courts of the United
States have no power or authority to review, to affirm, set aside or
annul the judgments and sentences imposed . . . . I' Justice
Douglas, who delivered the Court's opinion in Ahrens, concurred
in Hirota, explaining that Ahrens was not intended to impair the
"The Ahrens Court seemed to be particularly persuaded by the legislative
history of the Act of February 5, 1867. During the debate on the floor of the Senate,
the bill was opposed because "an application might be made to a district judge in
Florida to bring before him some men convicted and sentenced and held under
imprisonment in the State of Vermont or in any of the further States." CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 730 (1867) (remarks of Senator Johnson). This objection to the bill was remedied by an amendment which added the words "within
their respective jurisdictions." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 790 (1867) (remarks of Senator Trumbull).
"293 U.S. 131 (1934).
12338 U.S. 197 (1948).
"1293 U.S. at 138.
"The term "prematurity doctrine" is used by the Court in Peyton v. Rowe, 391
U.S. 54, 63 n.17 (1968).
"1338 U.S. at 198.
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availability of the writ, but only to provide better judicial administration according to the will of Congress. As Justice Douglas
pointed out, the "denial of a remedy in one District Court was not
a denial of a remedy in all of them."' 6
The prematurity doctrine and the Ahrens jurisdictional requirement remained largely unaltered until 19681 when the Supreme Court's decision in Peyton v. Rowe'l overruled McNally v.
Hill. Peyton specifically held that a prisoner serving consecutive
sentences in a state prison is "incustody" for federal habeas corpus
purposes and can, during any one sentence, challenge through federal habeas corpus the validity of a sentence to be served in the
future." Therefore, following Peyton, an inconsistent situation existed. Although the prematurity doctrine was abolished, the
Ahrens jurisdictional requirement remained unaltered. A prisoner
serving consecutive state sentences in the same prison could use
federal habeas corpus to challenge a future sentence, but a prisoner
serving consecutive sentences in different states was unable to attack the future sentence because he was not within the same jurisdiction as his future jailer. Federal prisoners are not confronted
with the same problem, since they may bring a challenge at any
time in the sentencing court irrespective of where they may be
incarcerated.2 0
Prior to Braden, the Supreme Court recognized this inequity.
In Nelson v. George,2' Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court,
noted that "[s]ound judicial administration" calls for an amend"Id. at 201 (concurring opinion 1949).
"In 1966, Congress amended section 2241 by adding subsection (d), which
allows a prisoner in custody in the state prison of a state having more than one
federal judicial district to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in either the
district court where he is in custody, or the district court where the state court that
sentenced him is located. No mention was made about the interstate problem, but
it is to be noted that this amendment was made prior to the Peyton v. Rowe
decision. Therefore, Congress could not have had the multistate problem in mind
during the consideration of this amendment.
'1391 U.S. 54 (1968).

"Id. at 67.

228 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) provides that a federal prisoner
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States...
may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or
correct the sentence. A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
21399 U.S. 224 (197.0).
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ment to section 2241 in order to correct the anomaly."2 The legislative change was never made.2n With this in mind, a majority of the
Court felt Braden a proper case in which to overrule Ahrens and,
thus, do judicially what the legislative branch had refused to do.
Justice Brennan, writing for five members of the Court in
Braden, ruled that since Peyton's abolition of the prematurity doctrine, a state prisoner is now able to use federal habeas corpus
proceedings as a means of attacking confinement which may be
imposed in the future.24 The majority reasoned that a state prisoner's physical presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the
district court was no longer a prerequisite to the exercise of federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction, so long as the court issuing the writ has
jurisdiction over the future custodian of the prisoner.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Powell, dissented vigorously, arguing that the Court's decision
upholds a district court's authority to command a state court to
determine the validity of an affirmative defense prior to trial., The
dissent also pointed out that the Court was legislating: "However
impatient we may be with a federal statute which sometimes may
fail to provide a remedy for every situation, one would have
thought it inappropriate for this Court to amend the statute by
judicial action.""6
It can be argued that from the vantage of the sound and evenhanded administration of justice, the Braden decision was necessary and desirable." The majority, however, failed to choose care-

DId. at 228 n.5.

"An amendment to § 2241 was drafted by the Administrative Conference of
the United States Courts and introduced during the 92d Congress, but no action
was taken on it. Braden v. Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 500 n.17 (1973).
2410 U.S. at 486.
2id. at 505 (dissenting opinion).
2Id. at 510 (dissenting opinion).
21It is at least questionable that this decision was needed, even for the equitable
administration of justice, because of an evolution in the state laws regarding interstate detainers. In 1958, an Interstate Compact was proposed by the Council of
State Governments as a solution to the problems caused by the detainer system.
Basically, the Compact provides that prison officials must inform prisoners of de-

tainers which are filed against them. A prisoner may then file a formal request for
trial on the outstanding charges, and the confining jurisdiction then agrees to grant
temporary custody of the prisoner to the prosecutor for the trial. If the filing jurisdiction fails to bring the defendant to trial within 180 days after request, the charges
are dismissed with prejudice in the filing state and the detainer is no longer valid.
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fully the factual situation in which to overrule Ahrens. As a result,
the decision in Peyton v. Rowe, which permitted prisoners serving
consecutive sentences to challenge through federal habeas corpus
proceedings the legality of a future sentence, may have been overextended by Braden. The specific problem is, as Justice Rehnquist
pointed out in dissent, that Braden had neither been convicted of
a crime nor sentenced to prison in the State of Kentucky.
The effect of the Braden decision is to make federal habeas
corpus relief available to a state prisoner who only might be required to serve a future state prison sentence. Federal habeas corpus, it seems, has been expanded into a pretrial testing device for
affirmative defenses which otherwise could only be aired at trial.
The final interpretation of the Braden decision will have to come
from the lower courts who must apply it. However, it seems clear
that a broad interpretation of Bradenwill lead to a situation where
federal habeas corpus can be used wherever there is a possibility
that a state prisoner's Constitutional rights have been infringed,
even though there has been no trial on the facts.
Charles J. Kaiser, Jr.
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION: PROGRAM FOR

1958, 81 (1957). To date, thirty-six states and the United States have accepted this
agreement. Act of Dec. 9, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-538, 84 Stat. 1397; ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN.

§

31-481 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN.

§

43-3201 (1949); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1389

(Deering 1971); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-23-1 (Supp. 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-186 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2540 (Cum. Supp. 1970); GA.
CODE ANN. § 77-501b (1964); IDAHO CODE § 19-5001 (Supp. 1970); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1003-8-9 (Smith-Hurd 1970); IOWA CODE ANN. § 759A.1 (1950); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-4001 (1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 1411 (Supp. 1972);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 616A (1971); MASS. ANN. LAWs, Special Acts 1965 ch. 892;
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 4.147(1) (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.294 (1947); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 222.160 (1962); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29.759 (1965); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 178.620 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 606A (1955); N.J. STAT.

ANN. § 2A:159A-1 (1971); N.Y. CODE OF CRMI.PRO. § 669b (McKinney 1957);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-89 (1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-34-01 (1960); Omo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2963.30 (Page 1954); ORE. REV. STAT. § 134.606 (1971); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 1431 (1964); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-221 (1962); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-3901 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-65-4 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
28, § 1501 (1970); VA. CODE ANN. § 53-304.1 (1972); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.100.010
(1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-14-1 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 976.05 (Spec. Pamphlet 1970); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-408.9 (Cum. Supp. 1973). If Kentucky and Alabama had had this type of legislation, there would have been no issue for the
Supreme Court to decide.
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